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FOREWORD
Political Law
Spencer Overton*
ABSTRACT
Traditional “election law” or “the law of democracy” concentrated
largely on constitutional analysis by judicial actors.  That narrow focus, how-
ever, distorted scholars’ understanding of the problems confronting democ-
racy and possible solutions.  This Foreword proposes that the field should be
understood more properly as “political law,” which includes the study of the
activities not only of judges but also of policymakers, regulators, and practi-
tioners.  The Foreword also examines the concept of “political law commu-
nity”—a concentration of scholars, judges, policymakers, regulators, and
practitioners interested in the subject that can give rise to innovation and crea-
tivity.  Finally, the Foreword reviews the George Washington University Law
School’s Political Law Symposium, which brought together a diverse group in
an attempt both to advance political law as a field and to build political law
community.
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INTRODUCTION
When I began organizing the Political Law Studies Initiative at
The George Washington University Law School,1 I sought advice from
some of the nation’s leading political law practitioners, policymakers,
regulators, and advocates.  Many explained to me the disconnect be-
tween their work and election law as traditionally defined by the legal
academy.  It struck me that, unlike fields such as antitrust, intellectual
property, securities, and tax, where scholars study the work not only
of judges but also of policymakers, regulators, and practitioners, elec-
tion law has focused predominantly on the work of the judiciary.
This Foreword discusses “political law,” which is broader than
traditional “election law.”  The study of U.S. Supreme Court decisions
about campaign finance, redistricting, and voting rights is at the heart
of both political law and election law.  Political law, however, also en-
compasses the study of the activities of a broader array of legal actors,
such as legislators and regulators, nonprofit organization advocates,
and practitioners working for law firms, political parties, corporations,
trade associations, and unions.  Further, political law covers nonelec-
tion topics such as lobbying, pay-to-play, and gift regulations.2
Part I of this Foreword asserts that the legal academy’s focus on
traditional, court-centered election law is too limiting and proposes
that scholars broaden their scope of inquiry beyond the judiciary.
Part II examines the concept of political law community—the poten-
tial for innovation and creativity that can arise from a geographic con-
centration of scholars, policymakers, regulators, practitioners, judges,
and advocates interested in the subject.  Part III reviews The George
Washington University Law School’s advancement of political law as a
1 The Political Law Studies Initiative at The George Washington University Law School
provides a political law curriculum for students and various lectures, panels, and social events for
government officials, practitioners, policy advocates, law students, and scholars to discuss ideas
and develop the political law field. See About the Political Law Studies Initiative, GW LAW,
http://www.law.gwu.edu/Academics/research_centers/politicallaw/Pages/AboutPLSI.aspx (last
visited Sep. 9, 2013).
2 Many large law firms in Washington, D.C. call their practice groups in this area “politi-
cal law.” See Bruce E. Cain, Election Law as a Field: A Political Scientist’s Perspective, 32 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1105, 1107, 1118–19 (1999) (articulating the “potential benefits to both the legal
scholars and political scientists if we thought of the field as political regulation rather than electo-
ral law”) (emphasis added).  I prefer the term “political law” to “political regulation” because I
consider judges to be only a part of the “law.”
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field and its attempt to build a community through its Political Law
Symposium, which brought together leaders in the field immediately
following the 2012 general election.
I. TRADITIONAL ELECTION LAW VS. POLITICAL LAW
Election law was first defined as a subject in 1983,3 and it grew
out of constitutional law and political science.4  Judicial opinions of
the U.S. Supreme Court have been the central focus of election law,5
and the enforcement of this rough boundary sparked a debate over
the name of the field.  Some follow the title of Professor Daniel Low-
enstein’s original textbook, Election Law.6  Others, such as Professors
Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, prefer the term “Law of De-
mocracy,” complaining that the term “election law” is too limited:
It narrows the field to microscopic regulatory details, as if
the more fundamental choices about conceptions of democ-
racy that underlie particular regulatory policies are fixed.
“Election law” runs the risk of signaling to potential new-
comers a tedious focus on the narrow regulatory questions of
most interest to political junkies and also of encouraging a
conceptualization of the field that meets these overly narrow
expectations.
. . . .
3 Paul Gronke, When and How to Teach Election Law in the Undergraduate Classroom,
56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 735, 737 (2012) (noting that “Election Law . . . was first claimed as a subject
in 1983” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4 Richard L. Hasen, Election Law at Puberty: Optimism and Words of Caution, 32 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1095, 1095 (1999) (describing election law as “related to but apart from its very
different parents, constitutional law and political science”); see also Daniel H. Lowenstein, Elec-
tion Law as a Subject—A Subjective Account, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1199, 1201 (1999) (“The key
events in [the growth of election law] were the constitutionalization by the Supreme Court of
representation in the early 1960s; the enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 and its applica-
tion by the Supreme Court . . .; and the enactment of the 1974 amendments to the Federal
Election Campaign Act and of comparable legislation in most of the states.” (footnotes
omitted)).
5 See e.g., Cain, supra note 2, at 1118 (“As defined by the forum and in the casebooks, the
field under discussion is election law.  As such, it limits the focus to the Court’s decisions in
electoral topics.”); Hasen, supra note 4, at 1100 (observing that “where the courts have led,
election law scholars surely have followed”).
6 See e.g., Hasen, supra note 4, at 1096 (“[Hasen] decided to use the term ‘election law’ in
this symposium, following the title of Daniel Lowenstein’s casebook.”).  Richard Hasen is also
the founder of the Election Law Listserv and the Election Law Blog, the cofounder of the Elec-
tion Law Journal, and a coauthor with Dan Lowenstein and Dan Tokaji on the Election Law
textbook. See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN & DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2012); Richard Hasen, ELECTION L. BLOG, http://elec-
tionlawblog.org/ (last visited Sep. 9, 2013); Richard L. Hasen, SCH. OF L. U.C. IRVINE, http://
www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/hasen/ (last visited Sep. 9, 2013).
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Ultimately our concern is with the structural aspects of con-
stitutional law, not the regulatory arcana of elections.7
The field’s early focus on constitutional law is understandable.
New fields need borders, both to facilitate meaningful conversations
among participants and to define themselves to outsiders.  The study
of a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions attracted the attention of
two groups essential to the growth of an emerging field: student edi-
tors who select law review articles for publication and faculty mem-
bers who vote on appointment and tenure.  Just as Chief Justice John
Marshall sustained the Court in its infancy by clearly distinguishing
law from politics,8 election law scholars distinguished their work from
that of bureaucrats and political operatives who craft and enforce the
bulk of the rules governing elections.  Election law scholars added
value to the development of law by flagging those jurists who strayed
too far into the political thicket without neutral principles,9 or by ex-
plaining how courts could more aggressively police the political
process.
Election law, however, has matured beyond the need to cloak it-
self in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.  The area now has various
scholars, courses,10 and centers at major law schools.11  It is docu-
7 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not by “Election Law” Alone, 32 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1173, 1174, 1183 (1999).
8 Jennifer Nedelsky, Confining Democratic Politics: Anti-Federalists, Federalists, and the
Constitution, 96 HARV. L. REV. 340, 352 (1982) (book review) (describing the view that Marshall
and the Federalist judiciary responded to “efforts at impeachment and alteration of the organiza-
tion, jurisdiction, and administration of the Court by removing law from the realm of politics”
(citing 2 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DE-
VISE: THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1801–15, at 396–97 (Paul
A. Freund ed., 1981))).
9 See Hasen, supra note 4, at 1101 (asserting that alternatives to “law professors and polit-
ical scientists debating the merits of election law judicial decisions” include judicial decisions
unchecked by scholars or returning to “an era when these questions were non-justiciable” and
leaving them to the legislative and executive branches).
10 A listing of over 100 professors who teach a form of election law is currently available at
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/database.xls.
11 Such centers include: the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of
Law, which has a Democracy Program that focuses on electoral reform, including voter registra-
tion, redistricting, and campaign finance, see Programs, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, http://
www.brennancenter.org/programs (last visited Sep. 9, 2013); the Center for Law and Politics at
Columbia Law School, which features a speaker series, research projects, and policy work that
focus on the legal regulation of politics, Center for Law and Politics, COLUM. L. SCH., http://www
.law.columbia.edu/centers/law-politics (last visited Aug. 23, 2013); Election Law @ Moritz at The
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, which offers expert commentary and an online
repository of documents on election law issues, see About EL@M, ELECTION L. @ MORITZ,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/about.php (last visited Sep. 9, 2013); the Election Law Pro-
gram at William & Mary Law School, which provides assistance to state court judges to resolve
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mented by four casebooks,12 an online listserv community and blog,13
a dedicated peer-reviewed journal,14 and regular law review
symposia.15
The activities of nonjudicial actors deserve serious study by legal
scholars.16
Looking at election questions largely through a judicial prism dis-
torts our understanding of the problems that confront democracy and
possible solutions to them.  Judges are most comfortable with disputes
that arise from discrete parties rather than broader questions about
democratic structure, and they generally push election law claims into
a conventional “individual rights versus state interest” paradigm.17
None of the members of the current U.S. Supreme Court have served
election law disputes, Election Law Program, WM. & MARY L. SCH., https://law.wm.edu/academ-
ics/intellectuallife/researchcenters/electionlaw/index.php (last visited Sep. 9, 2013); and the Polit-
ical Law Studies Initiative at The George Washington University Law School, which provides an
intensive political law curriculum and a neutral venue for government officials, practitioners,
policy advocates, law students, and scholars to discuss ideas and develop the political law field,
see About the Political Law Studies Initiative, supra note 1.
12 MICHAEL DIMINO, BRADLEY SMITH & MICHAEL SOLIMINE, VOTING RIGHTS AND ELEC-
TION LAW (2010); JAMES A. GARDNER & GUY-URIEL CHARLES, ELECTION LAW IN THE AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (2012); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H.
PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (4th ed.
2012);  LOWENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 6.
13 See Richard Hasen, ELECTION L. BLOG, supra note 6.  The Election Law Listserv, man-
aged by Daniel Lowenstein and Richard Hasen, is a forum for general discussion of substantive
issues related to election law and serves as a place where subscribers can discuss ideas they have
for scholarship, works in progress, and problems they are encountering in teaching and con-
ducting research. LAW-ELECTION—ELECTION L., http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/lis-
tinfo/law-election (last visited Sep. 9, 2013).
14 Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, founded by Daniel Lowenstein and
Richard Hasen and edited by Paul Gronke and Daniel P. Tokaji, is the leading peer-reviewed
journal dedicated to up-to-date coverage and analysis of election law issues. See Election Law
Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, MARY ANN LIEBERT, INC. PUBLISHERS, http://www
.liebertpub.com/ELJ (last visited Sep. 9, 2013).
15 See, e.g., Symposium, Election Law as Its Own Field of Study, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1095–1272 (1999); Symposium, Teaching Election Law, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 665–826 (2012).
16 See Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, The Institutional Turn in Election Law
Scholarship, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING
PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 86, 89 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken &
Michael S. Kang eds., 2011) (“Our primary complaint . . . is that election scholars, unsurprisingly,
continue to look to the courts for structural solutions.”); Cain, supra note 2, at 1118–19 (assert-
ing that election law limits the focus of the field to the Court’s decisions in electoral topics, and
proposing that the field be thought of as “political regulation” to open up the field to more
interdisciplinary research and to broaden the range of solutions to problems).
17 Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, De´ja` Vu All Over Again: Courts, Corporate
Law, and Election Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 86, 88 (2013) [hereinafter Gerken & Kang, De´ja`
Vu All Over Again], http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/forvol126_gerken_kang.pdf
(“Judges aren’t particularly adept at adjudicating the inherently structural claims at stake in
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as an elected official, and many federal judges lack the real world po-
litical experience or the empirical political science training to grapple
with thorny political questions.18
We deceive ourselves if we believe judicial actors make real “law”
while dismissing the directives of other actors as mere “politics.”  Al-
though judges espouse a patina of neutrality, their decisions are often
based upon subjective assumptions about democracy.19  Why is the
Court’s evolving definition of “corruption”—from a concept as expan-
sive as “buying access” to a more stringent “quid pro quo” stan-
dard20—any less political than the passage of campaign finance
restrictions by the legislature?  Several other political judgments exist,
such as determining the pervasiveness of voting discrimination, the
burden of photo identification, and whether impermissible entrench-
ment warrants judicial invalidation of a campaign finance law or a ger-
rymandered legislative district.
Those who envision election law as applied constitutional law
should appreciate that courts are not the sole constitutional actors.21
The U.S. Constitution explicitly designates regulatory powers over
elections to the states and to Congress,22 which in turn have delegated
power to various public agencies and private actors.  All of these enti-
ties produce the bulk of the decisions that make constitutional princi-
ples meaningful to average citizens.
election law cases. . . . [T]hey often prefer to render highly formalistic opinions in the language
of individual rights.”).
18 Id. at 88 (observing that “[judges] don’t possess the training to judge, let alone manage,
politics”).
19 Nedelsky, supra note 8, at 359–60 (“The language of law is the language of individual
rights, of neutral and immutable principles.  It hides the assumptions, values, and judgments
about the nature of freedom and the public good that underlie the conception of rights. . . . [I]t
removes or obscures aspects of class or social conflict.”).
20 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (explaining that political corrup-
tion is limited to quid pro quo corruption and does not encompass “influence over or access to
elected officials”).
21 See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law, the Political Process, and the Bondage of
Discipline, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1185, 1196 (1999) (“The law governing politics is a form of
applied constitutional law . . . .”); see also Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 7, at 1183 (“Ap-
proaching the law of democracy from this vantage point [of the structural aspects of constitu-
tional law] makes the field . . . a body of ideas that reflect the meaning and assumptions of
constitutional law itself.”); Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court: 2003 Term—Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 31 (2004) (asserting that
“issues concerning the design of democratic institutions and the central processes of democracy
have increasingly become questions of constitutional law”). See generally James A. Gardner,
Election Law as Applied Democratic Theory, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 689 (2012).
22 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1.
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Private practitioners, for example, petition the Federal Election
Commission (“FEC”) for a ruling on whether a federal independent
expenditure committee may accept contributions unlimited in size
(thus creating the so-called “Super PAC”),23 or whether a federal cam-
paign may accept small grassroots contributions via text messaging.24
State legislatures, secretaries of state, and county election boards and
clerks establish rules and allocate resources in ways that determine
the ease with which citizens may cast a ballot.
While it may be easier to criticize judges because they are gener-
alists with burgeoning dockets who lack the time, expertise, or incen-
tives to respond, nonjudicial decisionmakers may be a more engaged
audience, and they may have more to teach scholars.  Nonjudicial ac-
tors—and their incentives, strategies, behavior, legal directives, and
interactions—provide a more complete understanding of how demo-
cratic principles are actually manifested.25
We limit the scope, depth, and significance of our scholarship
when we focus solely on judges and fail to look for answers elsewhere.
The focus on federal judges prevents us from distinguishing between
problems best resolved by courts and those best resolved by other in-
stitutions.26  It prompts us to ignore important insights, such as align-
ing the incentives of elected officials with those of voters.27  We fail to
completely anticipate the consequences and behavior by political ac-
tors that follows from new rules (or the lack of such rules).  We fail to
consider the impact of evolving technology on politics, and we spend
too much time analyzing past controversies and not enough energy
anticipating the next battlefront.  Mimicking judicial classifications of
problems also divides us into different institutional silos, and we miss
discussions, insights, and solutions in overlapping areas.  Political ac-
tors, such as lobbyists who chair fundraising committees, do not al-
ways fit into such neat categorizations.28
23 See FEC Advisory Op. 2010-11, at 1 (2010).
24 FEC Advisory Op. 2012-17, at 1 (2013).
25 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (1998) (“[B]ehavioral economics allows us to
model and predict behavior relevant to law . . . with more accurate assumptions about human
behavior, and more accurate predictions and prescriptions about law.”).
26 Cain, supra note 2, at 1119 (“Thinking of the field in this way may also help us see more
clearly the proper line between problems that are best resolved by institutional changes as op-
posed to litigation and court intervention.”).
27 Gerken & Kang, The Institutional Turn in Election Law Scholarship, supra note 16, at
89 (suggesting that we should structure democracy to align the incentives of political actors with
constructive democratic goals and find ways “to harness politics to fix politics”).
28 Id. (“There are sensible reasons to divide the labor between the electoral and legislative
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The focus on constitutional law also overlooks key administrative
law issues.29  Some problems involve the structure of institutions that
regulate political activity such as allocating responsibility among fed-
eral, state, and local officials and between different branches and
agencies within each level of government; varying standards (or a lack
of standards) stemming from decentralization (for example, different
localities resolving similar disputes or multiple federal agencies inves-
tigating the same set of allegations); delegating discretion to private
actors such as political parties (for example, by allowing them to chal-
lenge voters at the polls); agency capture; and review of agency deci-
sions.  Other challenges stem from rulemaking and adjudication, such
as the adequacy of notice and process, the clarity and administrability
of legal directives, and the balance between consistency and flexibility
in decisionmaking.
The judiciary remains important, but it is just one part of an elec-
tion “ecosystem” that affects—and in turn is shaped by—other nonju-
dicial actors.30  Courts are unable to solve all of democracy’s
problems, but considering nonjudicial perspectives allows judges to
better understand the process and develop concepts to consider and
dispose of cases more appropriately.31
The “law of democracy” sounds lofty, but “political law” more
accurately captures the core of the field—how self-interested figures
act within an institutional framework.  A narrow focus on election law
prompts us to overlook nonelection governance issues, such as pay-to-
realms, but this disconnection is increasingly problematic in an era of continuous partisan con-
testation, in which electoral and legislative strategies are commonly fused.”); see also Michael S.
Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. Rev. 1, 58–63 (2012) (proposing that the
future of campaign finance regulation should focus on ex post regulation of corruption, such as
bribery prosecution and lobbying regulation).
29 Gerken & Kang, De´ja` Vu All Over Again, supra note 17, at 98 (asserting that adminis-
trative law rather than constitutional law or civil rights law might be the best reform for the next
generation of election law scholarship).
30 R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ, LONNA RAE ATKESON & THAD HALL, EVALUATING ELEC-
TIONS: A HANDBOOK OF METHODS AND STANDARDS 115 (2013) (explaining that “[e]lection ad-
ministration is a highly complex process that involves multiple actors all working to achieve the
goal of running an effective election”); STEVEN F. HUEFNER, DANIEL P. TOKAJI & EDWARD B.
FOLEY, FROM REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS: THE ELECTION ECOSYSTEMS OF FIVE MIDWEST-
ERN STATES 17 (2007) (“[A] state’s processes for administering its elections deserve to be under-
stood as an ecosystem because the choices that a state makes about the procedures and
requirements in one area inevitably affect the health and functioning of several other areas as
well.”).
31 Daniel R. Ortiz, From Rights to Arrangements, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1226 (1999)
(asserting that law and economics concepts like incentive effects and the Coase Theorem have
influenced private law cases, and that particular cultural assumptions and theories will begin to
influence courts as election law develops).
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play rules, government transparency, lobbying regulation, and legisla-
tive ethics committees.32
Expanding the scope of the field can seem messy and unsettling.
Once we open the gates beyond judicial opinions, what are the bound-
aries of “political law”?  Is government contracting political law?  Is
the act of lobbying political law?  What’s more, opening the doors be-
yond “election law” reveals the complexity of the problems that con-
front us.  Recognizing the inability of courts to solve all problems with
democracy, however, it is doubtful whether a better alternative exists.
Through their writing, scholars are starting to move away from
traditional court-centered election law and toward broader political
law.  The “new institutionalists” are emphasizing not just courts, but
also legislatures and other decisionmakers.33  In the aftermath of the
disputed election of 2000, scholarship and teaching about election ad-
ministration have gained new traction.34  Heather Gerken used input
from secretaries of state to shape her “Democracy Index,” and it now
informs and improves election administration.35  Professors Dan
Tokaji and Michael Halberstam organized a lobbying conference in
Spring 2013.36  An American Law Institute (“ALI”) Principles of
32 Bruce E. Cain, Teaching Election Law to Political Scientists, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 725,
731 (2012) (“Election Law strictly conceived only touches on the front end of representation—
that is, the selection of elected officials—and relegates the back end to legislative law.”).
33 Kirsten Nussbaumer, Election Law as Elective of Choice, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 747, 753
(2012) (“Much of this new scholarship, especially the so-called ‘new institutionalism,’ is in fact
pushing strongly toward greater emphasis on legislatures, administrative agencies, mechanisms
of direct democracy, and other political actors . . . .”); Gerken & Kang, De´ja` Vu All Over Again,
supra note 17, at 89 (“There’s been an institutional turn in election law, as academics have begun
looking away from the courts to cure what ails us.”); see also, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting
Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1812–13 (2012) (asserting that in-
dependent citizen commissions should adopt an arbitration system to reduce partisan stakes and
encourage coalition building); Jennifer Nou, Privatizing Democracy: Promoting Election Integ-
rity Through Procurement Contracts, 118 YALE L.J. 744, 750–51 (2009) (asserting that procure-
ment contracts are an important regulatory tool in election administration to further public and
private accountability); Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 631 (2007)
(proposing legislatures adopt a cost-benefit analysis in crafting voter identification laws).
34 Richard L. Hasen, Introduction: Developments in Election Law, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
565, 566–67 (2009) (“Since 2000, nuts-and-bolts scholarship is ‘in,’ though broad election law
scholarship on democracy and the courts certainly is not ‘out.’”). See generally Daniel P. Tokaji,
Teaching Election Administration, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 675 (2012) (discussing controversial elec-
tion administration issues that have emerged since the 2000 election).
35 HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR SYSTEM IS FAILING AND
HOW TO FIX IT (2009).
36 Conference at SUNY Buffalo Law School: Under the Influence? Interest Groups, Lob-
bying, and Campaign Finance (March 8–9, 2013) (a description of the conference can be found at
http://baldycenter.info/conferences/lobbying-and-campaign/); see also Richard Briffault, Lobby-
ing and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105 (2008) (dis-
1792 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:1783
Election Law project comprised of scholars, regulators, and practi-
tioners is providing model guidance for convenience voting.37  This
shift in focus toward the activities of nonjudicial actors represents one
of the most significant developments in the field.
II. POLITICAL LAW COMMUNITY
Intellectual communities bring together a critical mass of innova-
tive people with common interests.  A dynamic law school commu-
nity, for example, features stimulating faculty lunch presentations,
exchanges of draft papers, and casual office visits.  Venues such as
Silicon Valley, Nashville, and Los Angeles allow a core of creative
people to collaborate on new ventures, connect with friends at recep-
tions and over lunch, and respond to current events and evolving
trends.38  These academic, cultural, and professional communities al-
low people to develop personal relationships, affirm mutual aspira-
tions and interests, mentor and be mentored, exchange and hone
ideas, challenge conventional wisdom, and advance their respective
fields.39
Washington, D.C. possesses the concentration of professional ex-
pertise to be a vibrant political law community.  The city is home to
more lawyers who create, interpret, enforce, and practice political law
than any other city in the United States, and perhaps the world.  Vari-
ous corporations, trade associations, and unions hire significant num-
bers of in-house political law attorneys.  The area also has over four
dozen major law firms with political law or related practices, ten na-
tional party organizations,40 over thirty major election-related non-
cussing the need to bridge the disconnect between campaign finance and lobbying); Richard L.
Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191 (2012) (same);
Heather K. Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance (Nov. 12, 2011),
in 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1147 (2011) (same).
37 Reporter Edward B. Foley and Associate Reporter Steven F. Huefner lead the ALI’s
Principles of Election Law group. See Publications Catalog, AM. L. INST., www.ali.org/in-
dex.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=140 (last visited Sep. 10, 2013).
38 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., BEYOND PRODUCTIVITY: INFOR-
MATION TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND CREATIVITY 20–24 (William J. Mitchell, Alan S. In-
ouye & Marjory S. Blumenthal eds., 2003), available at http://lmc.gatech.edu/~xinwei/pub/texts/
Beyond_Productivity.pdf (discussing intellectual communities—“creativity clusters”—of the cre-
ative arts and the sciences).
39 See id.
40 Such organizations include: the Democratic National Committee; the Republican Na-
tional Committee; the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee; the National Republican
Senatorial Committee; the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee; the National Re-
publican Campaign Committee; the Democratic Governors Association; the Republican Gover-
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profit groups,41 and six congressional committees and several federal
agencies with jurisdictions that include political law.42  Actors working
in these environments provide a variety of professional perspectives—
civil trial work, criminal prosecution and defense, appellate work,
compliance, counseling, drafting regulations and legislation, legislative
oversight, and advocacy for particular reforms or clients before rele-
vant agencies and legislative committees.
Washington, D.C., however, is not the only venue with potential
for political law community.  Columbus, Ohio, for example, is home to
a critical mass of scholars at the Election Law @ Moritz program at
The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, the nation’s leading
scholarly skeptic of campaign finance regulation (Bradley Smith), the
Ohio Secretary of State, the Ohio Attorney General, relevant state
legislative committees, the Ohio Democratic and Republican parties,
and several political law practitioners and advocates.43
nors Association; the Democratic Legislative Campaign Committee; and the Republican
Legislative Campaign Committee.
41 Nonprofit groups with a significant presence in Washington, D.C. include the following:
Advancement Project; AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies; America Votes;
American Association of People with Disabilities; American Civil Liberties Union; Americans
for Redistricting Reform; Asian American Justice Center; Brennan Center for Justice; Campaign
Finance Institute; Campaign Legal Center; Center for Competitive Politics; Center for Respon-
sive Politics; Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington; Common Cause; Democracy
21; Electronic Privacy Information Center; Fair Elections Legal Network; Fair Vote; The Heri-
tage Foundation; Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; Leadership Conference on
Civil and Human Rights; League of Women Voters; NAACP; NAACP Legal Defense and Edu-
cational Fund (“NAACP LDF”); National Association of Latino Elected Officials; National As-
sociation of Secretaries of the State; National Council of La Raza; People for the American Way;
Pew Center of the States; Project Vote; Public Campaign; Public Citizen; SpeechNow.org; and
U.S. PIRG: The Federation of State PIRGs.
42 The congressional committees are the House Administration Committee, the House
Committee on Ethics, the House Judiciary Committee, the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Sen-
ate Rules Committee, and the Senate Select Committee on Ethics.  The federal agencies or com-
ponents thereof include the following: Election Assistance Commission; Federal Election
Commission; Federal Voting Assistance Program of the Department of Defense; Office of Gen-
eral Counsel and Legal Policy; Office of Government Ethics, Public Integrity Section of the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice; U.S. Office of Special Counsel; and Voting Sec-
tion of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice.
43 Geographic political law communities play a special role in developing the field, in part
due to the opportunity for constant personal interaction by participants, cultural immersion in
the subject, and honest one-on-one, off-the-record conversations.  Nongeographic political law
communities, however, also play a significant role in advancing political law, such as Richard
Hasen’s Election Law Listserv, and professional associations like: the American Association of
Law Schools’ Legislation and the Law of the Political Process Section; the American Bar Associ-
ation’s two political law committees (the Standing Committee on Election Law and the Election
Law Committee of the Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice); the Council on
Governmental Ethics Laws; the International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Offi-
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The need for community is particularly acute in political law.  Po-
litical affiliations often divide practitioners and policymakers.
Lawmakers and other actors often craft rules for their own advantage.
Regulated entities are often wary of regulators.  Technology evolves
and campaign and lobbying strategies change continuously, and thus
clients routinely raise novel questions for which lawyers can provide
no clear answers.  Political law actors often lack a neutral venue in
which to network and honestly discuss emerging problems and solu-
tions uninhibited by posturing or paper trails.
Political law community allows for interdisciplinary bridges be-
tween various actors.44  Lectures, panels, workshops, and symposia
give presenters and participants a chance to discuss emerging issues.
Receptions, lunches, and other informal gatherings give people an op-
portunity to build relationships and speak more intimately about sub-
stantive issues.  Political law community provides an opportunity to
develop a guild of leaders who discuss ideas and develop both formal
and informal norms.
Political law community can also afford the specialization and
scale necessary to allow for concentrated study by students.  Although
election law may be a two-credit boutique seminar at some law
schools,45 a large political law market and a couple of dozen interested
students can provide the demand for a more expansive curriculum.  In
addition to general courses on administrative law, legislation, corpo-
rate and labor law, and an introductory political law survey course, a
law school can offer several specialized seminars on subjects such as
voting rights, campaign finance, election administration, the law of
lobbying, and congressional investigations.
cials and Treasurers; the National Association of Election Officials; the National Association of
Secretaries of State; and the National Association of State Election Directors.  Law schools can
also convene the political law community around a particular issue.  The William & Mary Law
School’s Election Law Program, for example, specializes in assisting state court judges in resolv-
ing voting disputes. See Election Law Program, supra note 11.
44 Karlan, supra note 21, at 1196–97 (discussing bridges in Voting Rights Act of 1965 litiga-
tion between political scientists, historians, sociologists, legal scholars, and litigators).
45 See Chad Flanders, Election Law: Too Big To Fail?, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 775, 777 (2012)
(asserting that election courses may be getting “too big” and should clip back particular topics);
Gardner, supra note 21, at 693 (“[T]he fact that almost none of my students will be practicing
election law means that the function of the course in the law school curriculum is less to prepare
students for the actual field of practice they will enter than it is to build a more general kind of
legal and democratic citizenship.”); Nussbaumer, supra note 33, at 748 (“With U.S. Supreme
Court opinions as the focus of the field—and the fact that only a small percentage of law school
graduates have ever been situated to play a role in developing federal judicial doctrine about
elections—one might then suspect that election law as a start-up enterprise was indeed a pretty
high-end boutique.”).
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Political law community also provides the critical mass of profes-
sors—many of them top political law practitioners—who can intro-
duce students to cutting-edge issues and serve as mentors, contacts,
and references for future professional opportunities.  The scale and
specialization the field also allows for well-defined employment
tracks, including externships and summer positions with firms, politi-
cal parties, relevant legislative committees and agencies, advocacy
groups, and other entities.46
III. THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY’S SYMPOSIUM
ON POLITICAL LAW
This symposium attempted to contribute to a political law field
that increasingly focuses on both judicial and nonjudicial deci-
sionmakers.  It also aimed to help build the political law community
here in Washington, D.C.
The George Washington Law Review and the George Washing-
ton University Political Law Studies Initiative held the symposium
conference ten days after the 2012 presidential election.47  The na-
tion’s first African-American president had just been re-elected, and
the U.S. Supreme Court had just agreed to hear a case challenging the
preclearance and coverage provisions of the Voting Rights Act of
1965.48  The 2012 cycle had been the first presidential election to fea-
ture Super PACs,49 and it also featured new laws in several states such
as photo identification and proof of citizenship requirements, restric-
tions on early vote periods, and enhanced restrictions on former of-
46 See Nussbaumer, supra note 33, at 754–55 (describing an election-law focused extern-
ship with Minnesota’s Secretary of State).  The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law
boasts a legislation clinic that focuses in part on election-law issues such as campaign finance,
term limits, and direct democracy. See Terri L. Enns, Clinical Professor of Law, ELECTION L.
MORITZ, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/faculty/enns.php (last visited Sep. 10, 2013).  The
George Washington University Law School’s Political Law Society actively works to place stu-
dents in various positions in part through its database of internship opportunities (on file with
the author).
47 See 2012 GW Law Review Symposium: “Law and Democracy: A Symposium on the Law
Governing Our Democratic Process,” GW LAW (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.law.gwu.edu/News/
2012-2013Events/Pages/2012LawReviewSymposium.aspx.
48 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594
(2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (striking down the Act’s coverage formula); see also Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973–1973bb-1 (2006)).
49 See Election 2012: Super PAC Spending, LA TIMES (Nov. 20, 2012, 10:59 AM), http://
graphics.latimes.com/2012-election-superpac-spending/.
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fender voting rights.50  Our six panels provided an opportunity to
discuss these and other issues in depth.51
We were fortunate to attract thirty-five leaders in political law as
panelists.  Top scholars served on panels, including coauthors from all
four election law casebooks, an editor of the Election Law Journal,
the founder and moderator of the Election Law Blog and Election
Law Listserv, and the reporter for the ALI’s Principles of Election
Law project.52  Leading practitioners also spoke on panels, such as the
general counsel of the Barack Obama 2012 presidential campaign, the
chief counsel for the National Republican Senatorial Committee, the
former general counsel of the John McCain 2008 presidential cam-
paign, and the lawyer who represented George W. Bush against Al
Gore before the Florida Supreme Court in the election dispute of
2000.53  Panelists also included leaders in the campaign finance and
voting rights communities, and the president of the group that
monitors media spending by candidate campaigns nationwide.54
50 See Election 2012: Voting Laws Roundup, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 11, 2012),
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/election-2012-voting-laws-roundup.
51 To view the agenda for the symposium and video clips of the keynote addresses and
panel discussions, see PLSI’s “Symposium on Political Law”—Videos, Podcasts, Media Cover-
age, and Photos, GW LAW (Nov. 16, 2012) http://www.law.gwu.edu/Academics/research_centers/
politicallaw/Pages/SymposiumVideo.aspx.
52 Participating professors included: Richard Briffault (Columbia Law School); Guy-Uriel
Charles (Duke University School of Law); Adam Cox (New York University School of Law);
Kareem Crayton (University of North Carolina School of Law); Gilda Daniels (University of
Baltimore School of Law); Josh Douglas (University of Kentucky College of Law); Edward Fo-
ley (The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law); Heather Gerken (Yale Law School);
Lani Guinier (Harvard Law School); Richard Hasen (University of California, Irvine School of
Law); Sherrilyn Ifill (University of Maryland School of Law); Sam Issacharoff (New York Uni-
versity School of Law); Michael Kang (Emory University School of Law); Pamela Karlan (Stan-
ford Law School); Ellen Katz (University of Michigan Law School); Justin Levitt (Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles); William Marshall (University of North Carolina School of Law); Alan
Morrison (The George Washington University Law School); Nathaniel Persily (Columbia Law
School); Richard Pildes (New York University School of Law); Michael J. Pitts (Indiana Univer-
sity School of Law); Brad Smith (Capital University Law School); and Daniel Tokaji (The Ohio
State University Moritz College of Law). Id.
53 Practitioners included: Bob Bauer (General Counsel, Obama for America); Sean Cairn-
cross (Chief Counsel, National Republican Senatorial Committee); Michael Carvin (Jones Day);
and Trevor Potter (Campaign Legal Center, former General Counsel of Senator John McCain’s
2008 presidential campaign). Id.
54 Campaign finance or voting rights thought leaders included: Eliza Newlin Carney (Roll
Call); John Fortier (Bipartisan Policy Center); Ken Goldstein (President, Campaign Media Anal-
ysis Group, Kantar Media); Allison Hayward (formerly of Center for Competitive Politics);
Sherrilyn Ifill (NAACP LDF); Lawrence Noble (Americans for Campaign Reform); Myrna Pe´-
rez (Brennan Center for Justice); Brad Smith (Center for Competitive Politics); and Monica
Youn (Brennan Center for Justice). Id.
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We heard keynote addresses from two top regulators and policy-
makers of different political persuasions.  Donald McGahn, a member
of the FEC who has chaired the agency, spoke at the symposium din-
ner.  Tom Perez, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights at
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), delivered his remarks during
lunch the following day.55
In organizing the event, we actively recruited not only speakers,
but also symposium attendees, and we reserved a significant amount
of time for conversation among panelists and symposium attendees.
Most of the symposium participants were leaders in political law—
FEC commissioners and staffers, Election Assistance Commission
leadership, congressional staffers, DOJ lawyers, foundation officers,
leaders from advocacy groups, leading political law practitioners, and
journalists who cover political law.  In recruiting both speakers and
attendees, we aimed to gather leaders from different institutional silos
and create a unique space for conversation among those who create,
enforce, challenge, study, and practice political law.
In addition to panels and a published law review symposium, we
featured four opportunities for informal social interaction—a dinner,
a lunch, and two receptions—all of which allowed top policymakers,
regulators, practitioners, and scholars to meet new people and recon-
nect with old friends.  The intangible benefits of socialization cannot
be captured on these pages, but hopefully these interactions advanced
relationships and stimulated ideas that will shape future scholarship,
policymaking, enforcement, and practice.
Of those panelists who chose to contribute pieces to this sympo-
sium Issue, some focus on courts.  Gilda Daniels, for example, asserts
that the Voting Rights Act needs an administrative process to review
election changes due to voting discrimination.56  Joshua Douglas pro-
vides the first analysis of the impact of the recently developed
Twombly/Iqbal57 civil litigation pleading standard (heightened from
“notice pleading” to a more rigorous “factual plausibility” require-
ment) on election law cases.58  Edward Foley observes that Bush v.
Gore59 and several recent decisions reflect an indeterminacy that un-
dermines judicial credibility in political law cases and proposes various
55 Id.
56 Gilda R. Daniels, Unfinished Business: Why Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Is Still
Needed, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1928 (2013).
57 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
58 Joshua A. Douglas, Election Law Pleading, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1966 (2013).
59 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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strategies for managing the indeterminacy.60  Richard Hasen observes
that both liberal and conservative judges unexpectedly intervened as
backstops during the 2012 election cycle to prevent cutbacks in voting
rights.61  Bradley Smith distinguishes “elections” from “campaigns,”
and he asserts that the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly grant
power for government to regulate “campaigns” and instead creates a
“wall of separation” between campaigns and state power.62
Other contributors to this Symposium Issue focus on nonjudicial
issues.  Kareem Crayton challenges the application of an employment
gender bias lens to explain Hillary Clinton’s inability to secure the
2008 Democratic nomination for president.63  Michael Kang observes
that Super PACs in 2012 shifted political power to the very wealthy
but not between political partisans, and he predicts future power shifts
toward outside groups.64  Monica Youn examines an antigay marriage
ballot initiative to show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, disclo-
sure of even modest individual contributions can provide useful
insights.65
CONCLUSION
Election law has matured.  We should democratize the law of de-
mocracy by recognizing that political law includes the study of both
judicial and nonjudicial actors.  We should also advance the field by
consciously building political law communities that facilitate interac-
tion between leading scholars, policymakers, regulators, practitioners,
judges, and advocates.  This symposium attempts to advance both of
these goals.
60 Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1836
(2013).
61 Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of
Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865 (2013).
62 Bradley A. Smith, Separation of Campaign and State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2038
(2013).
63 Kareem Crayton, Gender Unbound? Making Sense of Hillary Clinton & Election 2008,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1799 (2013).
64 Michael S. Kang, The Year of the Super PAC, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902 (2013).
65 Monica Youn, Proposition 8 and the Mormon Church: A Case Study in Donor Disclo-
sure, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2108 (2013).
